

GÖG-Colloquium  
20<sup>th</sup> January 2026  
Dr. James Lomas  
Department of Economics and Related Studies



# Health opportunity costs

# Health system costs as health benefits foregone

“Any student of Econ 101 knows that economists measure costs by opportunity costs, meaning everything that is given up to get something else.” Alan Krueger



# The evaluation problem in health care

- What are the additional health benefits and additional costs of a proposed investment?
  1. What are the health effects of other things we could choose to do or others are likely to do if the resources were made available for other uses?
- OR
- 2. What are the health effects of those things we will need to give up or others are likely to give up if we commit these resources?
- Estimating the health effects of [marginal] health care expenditure provides an empirical estimate that is directly relevant to questions 1 and 2

# Some myths

- Only relevant if considering a single-payer NHS style health care system with a fixed budget
  - Really just a statement of basic economic problem with acknowledgement that financing of health care is challenging
- Requires an assumption that health care is about maximising health
  - Simply think that health is an important outcome of interest
- Believe that QALY is a perfect measure of health
  - Accept that a measure of health that combines length and quality of life (as judged by community preferences) is going to look like a QALY
- A welfarist style of economics where we look to individuals' and patients' preferences is broader
  - A truly welfarist perspective is in principle much more narrow since preferences are the sole valid input

# NICE and opportunity costs


**“A technology can be considered to be cost effective if its health benefits are greater than the opportunity costs of programmes displaced to fund the new technology, in the context of a fixed NHS budget...**

... In other words, the general consequences for the wider group of patients in the NHS are considered alongside the effects for those patients who may directly benefit from the technology.”


# NICE and its cost-effectiveness threshold

- Explicitly from 2004 (until 2026), standard cost-effectiveness threshold: £20,000 to £30,000 per QALY
  - Based on decisions made during first few years (founded in 1999), no empirical basis
  - Severity modifiers introduced in 2022 that increase threshold for some technologies
  - In some circumstances £200,000-300,000 per QALY
- From 2026, standard cost-effectiveness threshold: £25,000 to £35,000 per QALY

# Evidence of Health Opportunity Costs in the English NHS



# Estimating the health effects of health care expenditure



Policy questions:

- What is the return on healthcare expenditure?
- Should more money be allocated to healthcare?
- What are the opportunity costs of committing resources to a new healthcare intervention?
- What is the appropriate 'cost-effectiveness threshold'?




# Determinants of area-level spending on healthcare

Each area's budget reflects the national budget per person with adjustments for:

- a) the local age-cost index (this reflects the pure age/gender impact of the local population's demographic profile on healthcare costs);
- b) the additional needs index (this reflects local deprivation and other factors, such as the recent mortality rate);
- c) prices in the local health economy (this is labelled the market forces factor (MFF));
- d) the distance from target (DFT) index (this reflects how far each area's actual budget allocation is from its target allocation).

# Estimates of health opportunity cost



Martin S, Lomas J, Claxton K, Longo F. How Effective is Marginal Healthcare Expenditure? New Evidence from England for 2003/04 to 2012/13. *Applied Health Economics and Health Policy*. 2021 Jul 21.

# Health effects of healthcare spending in 2016/17

- Account for all expenditure
- Hospital spending (CCG), Primary Care and Specialised Commissioning
- Estimate the effects of each

Martin, S., Claxton, K., Lomas, J. Longo F. The impact of different types of NHS expenditure on health: Marginal cost per QALY estimates for England for 2016/17. Health Policy (2023)

## Mortality by disease area

- 1 All-cause mortality
- 2 Cancer
- 3 Circulatory disease
- 4 Gastro-intestinal (liver)
- 5 Respiratory disease
- 6 Infectious disease
- 7 Diabetes
- 8 Epilepsy
- 9 Implied all-cause mortality
- 10 Marginal cost per QALY (£)  
95% confidence interval

All specifications use the sum of three types of healthcare expenditure

2016/17 Total spend	2016/17 Total spend	2016/17 Total spend
full specification	parsimonious specification	IV lasso
column 1	column 2	column 3
-1.595***	-1.553***	-1.771***
-0.878***	-0.987***	-1.187***
-1.948***	-1.665***	-1.975***
-5.566***	-5.398***	-5.628***
-3.649***	-2.549***	-3.866***
-2.650**	-1.271***	-2.183*
-1.808	-0.987	-1.555
-1.438	-1.968*	-1.160
-1.650	-1.456	-1.746
£5,375 £3580, £10765	£5,767 £3994, £10458	£5,460 £3719, £10321

# Health effects of healthcare spending in 2016/17



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	2016/17 CCG core expenditure	2016/17 CCG core expenditure	2016/17 CCG core expenditure	2016/17 Specialized commissioning	2016/17 Specialized commissioning	2016/17 Specialized commissioning	2016/17 Primary care allocation	2016/17 Primary care allocation	2016/17 Primary care allocation
	full specification	parsimonious specification	IV lasso	full specification	parsimonious specification	IV lasso	full specification	parsimonious specification	IV lasso
Mortality by disease area	column 1	column 2	column 3	column 4	column 5	column 6	column 7	column 8	column 9
1 All-cause mortality	-1.103***	-1.200***	-1.053***	-0.051	-0.130	-0.088	-0.442***	-0.445***	-0.424***
2 Cancer	-0.551***	-0.386***	-0.658***	-0.112	-0.044	-0.101	-0.309***	-0.248***	-0.311***
3 Circulatory disease	-1.199***	-1.260***	-1.252***	0.174	0.196	0.161	-0.561***	-0.542***	-0.549***
4 Gastro-intestinal (liver)	-3.754***	-3.174***	-3.131***	0.262	0.264	0.156	-1.167***	-1.259***	-1.201***
5 Respiratory disease	-2.594***	-2.737***	-2.756***	-0.216	-0.225	-0.190	-1.060***	-1.199***	-1.143***
6 Infectious disease	-2.115**	-1.163**	-2.029**	-0.090	-0.095	0.105	-0.304	-0.319	-0.121
7 Diabetes	-1.632*	-1.398**	-1.598*	0.499	0.153	0.587	-0.601	-0.614	-0.346
8 Epilepsy	-1.456*	-0.062	-1.563*	-0.256	-0.147	0.379	0.861	0.527	1.041*
9 Implied all-cause mortality <sup>^</sup>	-1.129	-0.990	-1.169	-0.078	-0.054	-0.055	-0.441	-0.443	-0.447
10 Marginal cost per QALY <sup>^</sup>	£5,335	£8,071	£5,159	£11,600	£17,285	£32,469	£1,975	£1,891	£2,013
95% confidence interval	£3878, £8546	£5842, £12057	£3649, £8788	£3970, -£12627	£5320, -£13784	£9896, -£24933	£1408, £3380	£1381, £2969	£1409, £3510

NB [1]\*\*\* denotes p-value<0.01, \*\* denotes p-value<0.05, \* denotes p-value<0.10

[2] ^ denotes all positive regression coefficients have been set to zeros when calculating this value

> [Health Technol Assess.](#) 2015 Feb;19(14):1-503, v-vi. doi: 10.3310/hta19140.

**Met** > [Med Decis Making.](#) 2020 May;40(4):448-459. doi: 10.1177/0272989X20916450. Epub 2020 May 22.

**for Heal** > [Value Health.](#) 2019 Sep;22(9):995-1002. doi: 10.1016/j.

**thre Impl Estim** > [Health Econ.](#) 2018 Jun;27(6):1017-1023. (

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**Karl Claxton** Epub 2021 Jul 21.

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Health policy 132 (2023) 104800

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Health policy

journal homepage: [www.elsevier.com/locate/healthpol](http://www.elsevier.com/locate/healthpol)

## The impact of different types of NHS expenditure on health: per QALY estimates for England for 2016/17

Stephen Martin<sup>a</sup>, Karl Claxton<sup>b</sup>, James Lomas<sup>a,\*</sup>, Francesco Longo<sup>b</sup>

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<sup>b</sup> Centre for Health Economics, University of York, York YO10 5DD, UK

### ARTICLE INFO

#### Keywords:

Healthcare productivity

Healthcare expenditure

Mortality


Two-stage least squares estimation

Cost per quality-adjusted life year

### ABSTRACT

English data from 2003 to 2012 suggests that it costs the NHS £10,000 per quality-adjusted life year (QALY). This estimate relates to all NHS expenditure, including the costs of the health system. Different types of expenditure, however, may have different productivity. We explore the mortality response to three types of expenditure: backward selection and forward selection, and a full specification with all covariates. We use 2016 to explore the mortality response to three types of expenditure: backward selection and forward selection, and a full specification with all covariates. We use 2016 to explore the mortality response to three types of expenditure: backward selection and forward selection, and a full specification with all covariates.

# International Estimates of Health Opportunity Cost (September 2021)



## References

1. Claxton et al. (2015)
2. Vallejo-Torres et al. (2018)
3. Edney et al. (2018)
4. Van Baal et al. (2019)
5. Stadhouders et al. (2019)
6. Siverskog & Henriksson (2019)
7. Edoa & Stacey (2020)
8. Ochalek et al. (2020)
9. Martin et al. (2020)
10. Vanness et al. (2020)

## Legend

- Public healthcare
- Public health
- Private healthcare
- Hospital-based care
- Hospital-based CVD care
- All healthcare

# NICE and its cost-effectiveness threshold (revisited 1)

- Explicitly from 2004 (until 2026): £20,000 to £30,000 per QALY
  - Does not reject below £30,000 per QALY
  - Evidence that the effective threshold is £42,000 per QALY (2010) Dakin et al 2015
  - It cost the NHS less to deliver one year of life in good health ~£10,000 per QALY
  - Current NICE thresholds mean we are already doing more harm than good
- From 2026, standard cost-effectiveness threshold:  
£25,000 to £35,000 per QALY



# Population-health impact of new drugs recommended by the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence in England during 2000–20: a retrospective analysis

Huseyin Naci, Peter Murphy, Beth Woods, James Lomas, Jinru Wei, Irene Papanicolas

## Summary

Lancet 2025; 405: 50–60

Published Online

December 12, 2024

[https://doi.org/10.1016/](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(24)02352-3)

S0140-6736(24)02352-3

**Background** Health systems experience difficult trade-offs when paying for new drugs. In England, funding recommendations by the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) for new drugs might generate health gains, but inevitably result in forgone health as the funds cannot be used for alternative treatments and services. We aimed to evaluate the population-health impact of NICE recommendations for new drugs during 2000–20.

Received: 24 March 2023

Revised: 23 November 2023




Accepted: 11 December 2023

DOI: 10.1002/hecc.4795

## RESEARCH ARTICLE

Health  
Economics WILEY

## Achieving dynamic efficiency in pharmaceutical innovation: Identifying the optimal share of value and payments required

Beth Woods<sup>1</sup>  | James Lomas<sup>1,2</sup>  | Mark Sculpher<sup>1</sup> | Helen Weatherly<sup>1</sup> |  
Karl Claxton<sup>1</sup> 





# Is investing in medicines harming the health of the UK population?



15 January 2025 Posted in Blog by Victoria Jordan

## Should NICE's cost-effectiveness thresholds change?

We explore the ongoing debate around NICE's cost-effectiveness thresholds and what the future holds.



**Dr Jacqueline Bouvy**

Programme director for medicines evaluation



# Billions more to be spent on medicine as Keir Starmer scraps rules

NHS chiefs and Treasury at loggerheads over who will pay pharmaceutical companies more money for the most up-to-date and effective medicines

● NEW

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Chris Smyth, Whitehall  
Editor

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Wednesday October 08  
2025, 8.41am BST,  
The Times

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# NICE and its cost-effectiveness threshold (revisited 2)

- Explicitly from 2004 (until 2026): £20,000 to £30,000 per QALY
  - Does not reject below £30,000 per QALY
  - Evidence that the effective threshold is £42,000 per QALY (2010) Dakin et al 2015
  - It cost the NHS less to deliver one year of life in good health ~£10,000 per QALY
  - Current NICE thresholds mean we are already doing more harm than good
- From 2026, standard cost-effectiveness threshold:  
£25,000 to £35,000 per QALY
  - NICE already approves 91%
  - Looks at 71 new drugs (indications) per year
  - 2-5 additionally approved at the new threshold £35,000
  - But the price of the 91% will rise as well
  - Any additional approvals will do long term harm


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# Politicised Changes to the NICE Threshold Risk Making Cost-Effectiveness Analysis Performative, Not Informative

Editorial | [Open access](#) | Published: 09 January 2026


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